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I Got 99 Problems and They’re All FATCA 
 
By Nirav (Jonathan) Dhanawade* 
 
Abstract: Offshore personal income tax evasion accounts for approximately $50 
billion in annual lost revenue for the United States.  These large sums of money are 
squirrelled away in tax havens⎯jurisdictions, such as Aruba, the Cayman Islands, 
and Dubai, whose laws allow some U.S. citizens to evade paying their U.S. income 
taxes.  Before the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) was enacted, U.S. 
citizens could avoid taxes on passive income by not reporting this income to the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  To detect tax evasion, the IRS pursued U.S. citizens 
with undeclared assets in foreign banks.  But the IRS’s quest was largely unsuccessful 
because foreign financial institutions did not fully report U.S. account holders’ 
information.  While the IRS occasionally discovered offshore accounts, U.S. taxpayers 
were largely on the “honor system.”  Unfortunately, many U.S. taxpayers with 
offshore accounts have been dishonest.  As a result, Congress brought the hammer 
down with FATCA to combat and, more importantly, prevent tax evasion.  This 
Comment discusses FATCA’s provisions, particularly those that have been heavily 
criticized.  It then explores these criticisms from a domestic and foreign perspective.  
In doing so, this Comment examines and endorses Intergovernmental Agreements 
(IGAs) as (1) a solution to FATCA’s shortcomings and (2) a building block for 
developing a sustainable model of international tax transparency and information 
reporting.  Finally, this Comment argues that the United States should continue 
working with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development towards 
the adoption of a multilateral automatic information exchange standard that will 
enhance tax transparency and reduce tax evasion at an international level. 
  
 
* J.D., 2015, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., 2011, University of Delaware.  Every one 
of my accomplishments is attributable to the grace of God and the kindness of others.  This Comment is 
no different.  I thank David Miller for his keen insight and advice, and my colleagues at the 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business for their thoughtful input and time.  This 
Comment is as much theirs as it is mine.  I also owe a great deal of gratitude to my wife, Maja, for 
coming up with the title of this Comment and for her unwavering support in all of my endeavors. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A Swiss banker met his U.S. client in a remote-controlled elevator 
where bank statements, tucked within a Sports Illustrated magazine, 
exchanged hands.1  Another Swiss banker hauled bags of cash across the 
United States to help his U.S. clients avoid taxes.2  Both men worked for 
Credit Suisse AG, the target of a U.S. Department of Justice investigation 
that is expected to end in a settlement exceeding $780 million.3  Fourteen 
other banks, including rival UBS AG, are also being probed for helping 
U.S. citizens evade taxes through secret overseas accounts.4  One of these 
U.S. citizens⎯Beanie Babies creator and billionaire, H. Ty Warner⎯hid 
$25 million in overseas accounts.5  Standing before a federal judge in 
Chicago, the sixty-nine-year-old businessman tearfully admitted that he 
evaded $5 million in taxes.6 
At first glance, U.S. tax evasion seems like a trivial problem, 
especially in comparison to ostensibly more pressing issues facing 
Americans, including obesity,7 poor health care,8 and, of course, reality-
television-induced brain drain.9  But believe it or not, U.S. tax evasion has 
earned its place on the wall of shame.  Offshore personal income tax 
evasion accounts for around $50 billion in annual lost revenue for the 
United States.10  These large sums of money are squirrelled away in tax 
 
 1 Andrew Grossman, John Letzing & Laura Saunders, Ex-Banker’s Plea Deal Outlines Trail of a Tax-
Evasion Scheme, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2014, 7:33 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304914904579435090290201078?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj. 
com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052%20702304914904579435090290201078.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Susannah Nesmith & David Voreacos, Ex-UBS Banker Lack Pleads Guilty in U.S. Tax Case, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 26, 2014, 2:27 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-26/ex-ubs-banker-
lack-pleads-guilty-in-u-s-tax-case.html. 
 5 Beanie Babies Creator Pleads Guilty to Tax Evasion, NBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2013, 3:28 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/beanie-babies-creator-pleads-guilty-tax-evasion-8C11323460. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See Overweight and Obesity, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
obesity/data/facts.html (last updated Sept. 3, 2014) (discussing the “dramatic rise in obesity” in the 
United States). 
 8 See, e.g., The Shame of American Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/11/18/opinion/the-shame-of-american-health-care.html?_r=0 (“[B]y virtually all measures of 
cost, access to care and ease of dealing with insurance problems, Americans fared poorly compared with 
people in other advanced countries.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Melissa Dahl, Watching ‘Jersey Shore’ Might Make You Dumber, Study Suggests, NBC 
NEWS (Jun. 17, 2011, 6:20 AM), http://bodyodd.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/06/ 17/6851542-watching-jersey-
shore-might-make-you-dumber-study-suggests?lite (discussing media priming: the “idea that the things 
we watch or listen to or read influence[s] our emotions and our behavior”). 
 10 Frederic Behrens, Comment, Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: Why FATCA Will Not Stand, 
2013 WIS. L. REV. 205, 207 (2013) (citing Steven A. Dean, More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax 
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havens⎯jurisdictions, such as Aruba, the Cayman Islands, and Dubai, 
whose laws allow some U.S. citizens to evade paying their U.S. income 
taxes.11  Before the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)12 was 
enacted, U.S. citizens could avoid taxes on passive income, including 
interest, dividends, and capital gains, by not reporting this income to the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).13 
To detect tax evasion, the IRS pursued U.S. citizens with undeclared 
assets in foreign banks.14  But its quest was largely unsuccessful15 because 
foreign financial institutions (FFIs) did not fully report U.S. account 
holders’ information.16  While the IRS occasionally discovered offshore 
accounts, U.S. taxpayers were largely on the “honor system.”17  
Unfortunately, many U.S. taxpayers with offshore accounts have been 
dishonest.18  As a result, Congress brought the hammer down with FATCA 
to combat and, more importantly, prevent tax evasion.19 
This Comment argues that the United States should continue working 
with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) towards the adoption of a multilateral automatic information 
exchange standard that will enhance tax transparency and reduce tax 
evasion at an international level.  This Comment proceeds as follows: Part 
II discusses FATCA’s provisions, particularly those that have been heavily 
criticized.  Part III explores these criticisms from a domestic and foreign 
perspective.  In Part IV, this Comment reviews the tax transparency and 
information exchange standards proposed by the Global Forum on Tax 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Global 
Forum).  Finally, Part V utilizes these standards to examine and endorse 
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) as (1) a solution to FATCA’s 
shortcomings and (2) a building block for developing a sustainable model 





Deharmonization and the Future of the International Tax Regime, 84 TUL. L. REV. 125, 132 (2009)). 
 11  Id. at 206. 
 12  FATCA is a federal law aimed at reducing tax evasion by U.S. taxpayers with offshore accounts.  
See infra Part II. 
 13  Behrens, supra note 10, at 206–07. 
 14  Id. at 207. 
 15  J. Richard (Dick) Harvey, Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of FATCA and Its Potential 
Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471, 473 (2012). 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. 
 19  See Melissa A. Dizdarevic, Comment, The FATCA Provisions of the Hire Act: Boldly Going 
Where No Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2967, 2968–69 (2011). 
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II.  KEEP IT SIMPLE, STUPID: FATCA DELINEATED 
 
Congress’s primary goal in passing FATCA was to prevent tax evasion 
by U.S. taxpayers with offshore accounts.20  Specifically, FATCA was 
designed to address the “deliberate and illegal hiding of assets and income 
from the IRS by U.S. citizens and residents.”21  Legislation was introduced 
in October 200922 and modified in December 200923 before FATCA was 
finally adopted as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act 
in March 2010.24   
FATCA’s approach is two-pronged with one prong addressing 
individual taxpayers and the other prong addressing FFIs.25  The following 
sections explore FATCA’s dual-pronged approach. 
 
A.  The People Problem: § 6038D 
 
 FATCA enacted § 6038D, which requires individuals holding “any 
interest in a specified foreign financial asset” to disclose these assets in 
their Form 1040 if the assets’ aggregate value exceeds $50,000 during “any 
taxable year.”26  This reporting requirement took effect with 2011 income 
tax returns.27  Section 6038D(b) defines a “specified foreign financial asset” 
as follows: 
 
(1) any financial account . . . maintained by [an FFI] . . . , and 
 
(2) any of the following assets which are not held in an account 
maintained by a financial institution . . . 
 
(A) any stock or security issued by a person other than a United 
States person, 
 
 20  See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last updated June 9, 2014) 
(“FATCA was enacted in 2010 by Congress to target non-compliance by U.S. taxpayers using foreign 
accounts.”). 
 21  Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select 
Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 13 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] 
(statement of William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service). 
 22  Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2009, H.R. 3933, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 23  H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 24  Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501–535, 124 Stat. 71, 
97–115 (2010). 
 25  Id. 
 26  I.R.C. § 6038D (2010). 
 27  Id. 
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(B) any financial instrument or contract held for investment that 
has an issuer or counterparty which is other than a United States 
person, and 
 
(C) any interest in a foreign entity.28 
 
Under § 6038D(h)(1), the IRS can also create exceptions to these reporting 
requirements to avoid duplicative disclosures.29 
 
1.  Big Brother is Watching: Required Information Reporting 
 
 Section 6038D(c) specifies the following foreign asset information that 
U.S. taxpayers must disclose: (1) the name and final address of the FFI 
where assets are maintained, including the number of the account; (2) for 
stocks or securities, “the name and address of the issuer” and any other 
relevant information necessary to identify the stock or security’s class or 
issue; (3) for instruments, contracts, or interests, “such information as is 
necessary to identify such instrument[s], contract[s], or interest[s]” and “the 
names and addresses of all issuers and counterparties”; and (4) the assets’ 
maximum values during the taxable year.30 
 
2.  Few Carrots, Mostly Sticks: Penalties Under § 6038D 
 
If individual taxpayers fail to disclose the foreign asset information 
required under § 6038D(c), FATCA penalizes them $10,000.31  If a 
taxpayer still fails to disclose this information for more than ninety days 
after notification by the IRS, the taxpayer is levied an additional penalty of 
$10,000 for each thirty-day period or fraction thereof.32 
FATCA attempts to balance this “stick” with a “carrot.”  Section 
6038D(g) permits a waiver of the penalties described above if the failure to 
disclose required foreign asset information was due to “reasonable cause 
and not due to willful neglect.”33  Still, this carrot is tempered by the 
 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. § 6038D(h)(1); see also Alan S. Lederman & Bobbe Hirsh, The American Assault on Tax 
Havens-Status Report, 44 INT’L LAW. 1141, 1142 (2010) (stating that the IRS can create exceptions to 
“passive foreign investment company (PFIC) and controlled foreign corporation stockownership 
reporting”). 
 30  I.R.C. § 6038D(c) (2010). 
 31  Id. § 6038D(d)(1). 
 32  Id. § 6038D(d)(2).  But any additional penalties imposed under § 6038D(d)(2) cannot exceed 
$50,000.  Id. 
 33  Id. § 6038D(g). 
_JD_DHANAWADE FINAL READ_2.7.2015.docx (DO NOT  DELETE) 3/12/15  8:12 AM 
I Got 99 Problems and They’re All FATCA 
35:139 (2014) 
145 
provision that foreign secrecy laws do not constitute “reasonable cause.”34  
Additionally, the $50,000 threshold for mandatory disclosures is considered 
met (1) if the IRS discovers specified foreign financial assets, and (2) if the 
taxpayer fails to provide sufficient information indicating that the total 
value of these assets does not exceed $50,000.35 
FATCA also imposes a stiff 40% penalty on financial understatements 
of undisclosed financial assets.36  Notably, understatements of financial 
statements exceeding $5,000 are still fair game even if the existing three-
year statute of limitations has run because § 6501 permits for its extension 
under these circumstances.37  With FATCA’s approach to addressing 
individual taxpayers as a backdrop, the following section examines 
FATCA’s approach to FFIs. 
 
B.  FFIs and Non-FFIs: §§ 1471 and 1472 
 
FATCA’s second prong addresses FFIs.38  Specifically, FATCA 
imposes a 30% tax on “withholdable payments” to FFIs that meet § 1471’s 
criteria.39  FATCA also imposes a 30% tax on withholdable payments to 
certain foreign entities that are not FFIs (non-FFIs).40  The following 
subsections (1) define FFIs and “withholdable payments,” (2) discuss the 
30% withholdable tax, and (3) distinguish FATCA’s tax withholding 
system from another tax withholding system that the United States already 
employs. 
 
1.  How to Spot an FFI 
 
Section 1471(d)(4) defines an FFI as “any financial institution which is 
a foreign entity,” not including financial institutions organized “under the 
laws of any possession of the United States.”41  Thus, FFIs are defined 
 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. § 6038D(e). 
 36  See The Section 6662(e) Substantial and Gross Valuation Misstatement Penalty, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-apa/penalties6662_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). 
 37  I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (2010). 
 38  See id. §§ 1471, 1472. 
 39  See id. § 1471(a).  The withholding tax does not apply to FFIs that enter into an FFI Agreement 
with the IRS.  But FFIs must deduct 30% of any passthru payment to either a recalcitrant account holder 
or other FFI that has not entered into an FFI Agreement.  Id. § 1471(b)(1)(D). 
 40  Id. § 1472. 
 41  Id. § 1471.  Section 1471(d)(5) defines “financial institution” as any entity that does one of the 
following: 
(A) accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a banking or similar business, 
(B) as a substantial portion of its business, holds financial assets for the account of others, 
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broadly to include foreign banks, trust companies, brokerage firms, mutual 
funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds.42 
 
2.  Demystifying “Withholdable Payments” 
 
Congress through § 1473 defined “withholdable payments” as the 
following: 
 
(i) any payment of interest (including any original issue 
discount), dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, 
compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or 
determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, if 
such payment is from sources within the United States, and  
 
(ii) any gross proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any 
property of a type which can produce interest or dividends from 
sources within the United States.43 
 
Section 1473 also defines “withholding agent” as “all persons, in 
whatever capacity acting, having the control, receipt, custody, disposal, or 
payment of any withholdable payment.”44  Thus, income that would 
otherwise be exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code may 
now be subject to FFI withholding under FATCA unless an FFI enters into 
an FFI Agreement.45 
 
3.  FFIs’ Guide to Avoiding the Withholding Tax 
 
While a 30% withholding tax might seem harsh, FATCA provides 
FFIs with a way to avoid the tax⎯compliance.46  Specifically, § 1471(b) 
provides that FFIs can avoid the 30% withholding tax by taking the 
following steps: (1) identifying their U.S. accounts; (2) complying with due 
diligence and verification procedures regarding possible U.S. accounts; 
 
or 
(C) is engaged . . . primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in 
securities . . . , partnership interests, commodities . . . , or any interest . . . in such 
securities, partnership interests, or commodities. 
Id. 
 42  Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 29, at 1143. 
 43   I.R.C. § 1473 (2010). 
 44  Id. § 1473(4). 
 45  Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 29, at 1144 (stating that withholdable payments encompass capital 
gains, portfolio interest, bank deposit interest, and recovery costs of U.S. stocks and bonds). 
 46  See I.R.C. § 1471(b) (2010). 
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(3) annually reporting information about these U.S. accounts to the IRS; 
(4) withholding the 30% FATCA tax, or be withheld upon, on passthru 
payments to other FFIs that did not enter into FFI agreements with the IRS, 
or on payments to recalcitrant account holders who fail to supply 
information regarding U.S. account ownership; (5) complying with any IRS 
requests for additional information about U.S. accounts; and (6) if foreign 
law prevents disclosure, seeking a waiver of the law or closing the account 
in question if a waiver cannot be obtained.47 
Under § 1471(b)(2)(A), an FFI can also avoid the 30% withholding tax 
if (1) the FFI complies with IRS procedures ensuring that it does not 
maintain U.S. accounts and meets requirements prescribed by the IRS 
regarding other FFIs’ accounts, (2) the FFI is a “member of a class of 
institutions” for which the IRS creates an exception,48 or (3) the FFI does 
not invest in U.S. assets.49 
Having described FATCA’s provisions, the following subsection now 
distinguishes FATCA’s withholding system from that of its predecessor. 
 
4.  Distinguishing FATCA Withholding from Chapter 3 
Withholding 
 
Prior to FATCA’s enactment, the United States already employed a 
tax withholding system under Chapter 3 of the Internal Revenue Code.50  
Under Chapter 3, a withholding agent must withhold 30% of any U.S.-
source payment, including fixed, determinable annual, or periodical 
(FDAP) income made to foreign persons.51  But unlike FATCA’s tax 
withholding system, which applies to all U.S.-source payments to FFIs and 
certain Non-Financial Foreign Entities,52 Chapter 3 withholding only 
applies to payments to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations.53 
FATCA also imposes a withholding tax on gross proceeds from the 
sale or disposition of income-producing property from a U.S. source, and 
FDAP income.54  FATCA withholding is therefore fundamentally different 
from Chapter 3 withholding, but collectively, these mechanisms produce a 
more robust withholding structure than previously existed. 
 
 47  Id. 
 48  Id. (“[S]uch institution is a member of a class of institutions [that] . . . the Secretary has 
determined that the application of this section is not necessary to carry out the purposes of this 
section.”). 
 49  See id. § 1473(1). 
 50  See id. § 1441. 
 51  Id. 
 52  See id. § 1472. 
 53  See id. §§ 1441–1442. 
 54  Id. § 1473(1)(A)(ii); see also id. § 1441(b). 
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III.  READING THE COMMENT BOX: WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
FATCA? 
 
Despite the United States’ legitimate need to detect and deter offshore 
personal income tax evasion, FATCA’s passage was commemorated with 
much gnashing of teeth⎯a sentiment that continues to grow.55  The 
following sections explore the complaints of U.S. banks and U.S. citizens 
living abroad, as well as foreign countries and their financial institutions. 
 
A.  The Overseas Outcry 
 
To avoid complying with FATCA’s disclosure requirements, some 
FFIs are severing ties with their U.S. account holders.56  These FFIs cite the 
costs of compliance as the reason for their decision.57  Consequently, some 
U.S. citizens living abroad criticize FATCA for making it difficult for them 
to establish and maintain foreign bank accounts.58 
Alarmingly, even more U.S. citizens living abroad could face account 
closures if their foreign banks cannot comply with FATCA’s disclosure 
requirements.59  This is likely to happen when a bank is not large enough to 
comply, but is simultaneously too large to altogether avoid U.S. 
investments.60  As a result, these U.S. citizens may be limited to opening 
and maintaining accounts with smaller foreign banks that do not hold any 
U.S. portfolios.61  Certain critics, including Marylouise Serrato and 
Jacqueline Bugnion of American Citizens Abroad,62 predict that eventual 
FATCA exclusions might also cause these U.S. citizens to have difficulty 
purchasing foreign insurance policies and pension funds.63 
Therefore, for some U.S. citizens living abroad, the burden of 
complying with FATCA’s individual reporting requirements trumps the 
 
 55  See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 21, at 7. 
 56  Joanna Heiberg, FATCA: Toward A Multilateral Automatic Information Reporting Regime, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1685, 1702 (2012). 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 29, at 1147. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. 
 62  American Citizens Abroad is an organization that claims to represent the interests of U.S. citizens 
residing overseas.  See FAQ about ACA, Inc., AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, https://americansabroad.org/ 
about/faq-about-aca-inc/ (last updated Oct. 10, 2013). 
 63  Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 29, at 1147.  FFIs might altogether refuse to deal with U.S. 
citizens living abroad.  Olga Basko, FATCA: Taxes Just Got More Complicated, COL. BUS. L. REV. 
ONLINE (Dec. 3, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12917. 
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advantages of U.S. citizenship.64  But the U.S. Department of State does not 
let these patriots off the hook easily⎯renunciation comes with a $450 price 
tag.65  Former U.S. citizens are also not relieved of their existing tax 
liabilities and penalties owed.66  Moreover, Uncle Sam levies a special “exit 
tax” on the soon-to-be-former U.S. citizens with a net worth of at least $2 
million, or an annual income of about $150,000.67  So while renunciation 
allows U.S. citizens living abroad to avoid FATCA’s reporting 
requirements, it comes at a considerable price. 
 
B.  The Tax Treaty Veto 
 
A second criticism of FATCA is that it effectively constitutes a tax-
treaty veto by overriding contradictory provisions in existing income-tax 
treaties.68  FATCA’s information reporting requirements are more 
demanding than those of existing tax treaties.69  And as discussed above, 
FATCA imposes a 30% withholding tax on noncompliant FFIs regardless 
of their withholding rates under existing tax treaties.70  Under some tax 
treaties, certain taxpayers can obtain reduced withholding rates through a 
refund mechanism.71  But courtesy of FATCA, these preferential 
withholding rates do not apply when an FFI is a payee.72 
 
C.  Shhh!  Bank Secrecy Concerns 
 
FATCA also creates concerns in the realm of local bank-secrecy laws 
because many foreign countries do not allow their banks or financial 
institutions to divulge clients’ information to other governments.73  
 
 64  Heiberg, supra note 56, at 1702. 
 65  Id. at 1703. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. 
 68  See id.; see also id. at 7, 62 (“Treaty overrides adversely affect the treaty-making process and 
historically have been avoided unless essential to the ends sought by the legislation.”). 
 69  Id. at 1703. 
 70  Id. (discussing how FATCA’s provisions override those of governing tax treaties). 
 71  Id.  For examples of existing tax refund mechanisms, see I.R.C. § 1445(c)(1)(C) (2012).  
“Economic double taxation” occurs when two or more countries tax an individual or entity on the same 
income.  To avoid economic double taxation, domestic tax laws can (1) employ the credit method by 
providing credit against domestic taxes for foreign taxes paid on the same income or (2) exempt the 
income from domestic taxation.  Internal Revenue Manual – 4.60.3 Tax Treaty Related Matters, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/ irm/part4/irm_04-060-003.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 72 Heiberg, supra note 56, at 1703–04. 
 73  See, e.g., David Jolly & Brian Knowlton, Law to Find Tax Evaders Denounced, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
27, 2011, at B1 (quoting Jeffrey Owens, tax expert at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) (“Enforcement of the law will be tricky, as many countries . . . forbid banks or companies 
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Moreover, FATCA requires FFIs and foreign banks to deny accounts to 
U.S. citizens if they cannot comply with its reporting requirements.74 
But for some FFIs, simply avoiding U.S. assets may not be enough 
because, under FATCA’s passthru reporting requirement, certain non-U.S. 
income is subject to required reporting if the income is attributable to a 
withholdable payment.75  Some critics argue that the passthru provision 
forces foreign banks to ensure that all of their non-U.S. funds comply with 
FATCA’s reporting requirement.76  One of these critics, the British 
Bankers’ Association (BBA), labeled the passthru payment “simply 
unworkable.”77  Cue Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs). 
 
D.  More Money, More (Local) Problems 
 
Within FATCA’s framework, IGAs involve FFIs reporting U.S. 
account holders’ information to their respective national tax authorities that, 
in turn, provide this information to the United States.78  Under existing non-
FATCA IGAs, U.S. banks already provide substantial information to 
foreign governments.79  The IGA approach, discussed in greater detail in 
Part V of this Comment, circumvents the legal impediments that FATCA 
poses.80  IGAs also reduce FFIs’ burden of compliance by allowing them to 
report U.S.-account information through their respective national 
governments.81  The IGA approach is therefore the solution to the 
previously referenced criticism by the BBA.82 
Under FATCA, U.S. banks will need to develop and maintain systems 
tying account holders’ nationalities to their respective accounts.83  
FATCA’s critics argue that this is currently unfeasible given the lack of 
 
to transfer such information directly to a foreign government.”).  Countries such as Switzerland are 
popular destinations for U.S. citizens looking to set up a “nest egg” overseas.  See, e.g., Mark Nestmann, 
Despite Tightening of U.S. Laws, Switzerland Remains a Safe Haven for Money, HEARTLAND INST. 
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2014/08/05/despite-united-states-laws-
switzerland-still-safe-haven-money. 
 74  Behrens, supra note 10, at 222. 
 75  See I.R.C. § 1471 (2010).  Regulations have delayed withholding passthru payments until 2017 at 
the earliest.  See generally IRS, NOTICE 2013-43, REVISED TIMELINE AND OTHER GUIDANCE 
REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FATCA (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-
13-43.pdf. 
 76  Behrens, supra note 10, at 221. 
 77  Id. 
 78  FATCA Key Terms, THOMSON REUTERS, http://fatca.thomsonreuters.com/about-fatca/key-terms/ 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
 79  See Behrens, supra note 10, at 222. 
 80  See id. at 215. 
 81  Id. 
 82  See id. at 221.   
 83  Id. at 222. 
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existing regulations directing U.S. banks.84  This is, however, an 
exaggerated claim because existing antiterrorism and money laundering 
laws currently place U.S. banks in a better position than ever before to 
implement FATCA’s measures.85  A related criticism, that FATCA’s 
compliance measures will raise the cost of domestic banking services for 
retail U.S. customers, is at best unclear.86 
 
E.  More Money, More (Foreign) Problems 
 
Yet another criticism of FATCA is that its requirements place a high 
financial burden on FFIs.87  For example, the Institute of International 
Bankers (the Institute) predicts that compliance with FATCA might cost 
international banks over $250 million.88  Other foreign businesses predict 
that annual compliance costs might actually be billions of dollars.89  But 
these numbers are mere predictions.90  For example, in reaching the 
aforementioned $250 million figure, the Institute stated that “several large 
institutions” estimated on a “conservative basis” that they would incur an 
average cost of $10 per account to properly identify and document 
customers’ accounts.91  The Institute did not specify (1) which institutions 
made the $10-an-account prediction, (2) why this prediction is accurate, and 
(3) how this prediction is “conservative.”92  So while the Institute has 




 84  Id. 
 85  See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2010); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (2001). 
 86  Behrens, supra note 10, at 222.  Because FATCA has yet to be fully implemented, speculation 
about U.S. banks shifting their increased costs of compliance on to retail U.S. consumers is just 
that⎯speculation.  Nonetheless, as Behrens correctly states, U.S. banks are currently in a better position 
than ever before to implement FATCA’s compliance measures because of antiterrorism and money 
laundering laws currently in force.  Thus, the additional cost of FATCA-specific compliance remains 
unclear.  Similarly, the degree to which this compliance will affect U.S. retail consumers is equally 
unclear.  See id. 
 87  Heiberg, supra note 56, at 1704. 
 88  Id. at 1704–05. 
 89  Id. at 1705. 
 90  See EUR. BANKING FED’N & INST. OF INT’L BANKERS, COMMENTS ON NOTICE 2010-60 PROVIDING 
PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE ON FATCA (Nov. 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.cticompliance.com/assets/pdf/EBF-IIB%202010%2011%2012.pdf (“Our members are still 
attempting to quantify the potential cost [of FATCA] . . . preliminary indications are that costs will be 
staggering.”) (emphasis added). 
 91  Id. 
 92  See generally id. 
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Relatedly, critics assert that FATCA might cause some FFIs to 
altogether avoid investing in the United States.93  This, in turn, might 
discourage future U.S. investments by other FFIs, or it might shift the costs 
of compliance on to American investors.94  But, as with the Institute’s $10-
an-account prediction, it is still too early to verify or discredit this criticism. 
 
F.  Complexity, Confusion, Calamity? 
 
Lastly, critics, including the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS),95 bash 
FATCA for worsening an already complex and confusing system of 
international taxation.96  According to these critics, the IRS should focus on 
taxpayer services, not international law enforcement.97  But they seem to 
have forgotten that it was Congress, the most representative branch of the 
U.S. government,98 and not the IRS, that passed FATCA.99  Thus, the IRS 
does not have any choice but to enforce FATCA.  A more logical complaint 
might be the lack of clear guidance provided to the IRS by Congress, but 
alas, FATCA bashing is the TAS’s province. 
 
IV.  LESSONS FROM OVERSEAS: THE GLOBAL FORUM’S 
APPROACH 
 
The preceding sections described FATCA’s origin, design, and 
defects.  The following section discusses the Global Forum and explains the 
tax transparency and information exchange standards that it has proposed.  
These standards are then used to propose modifications to FATCA’s 
approach. 
 
A.  Not Just Another Useless International Organization 
 
The Global Forum is the continuation of a forum created by the OECD 
to address tax compliance issues caused by tax havens.100  It originally 
 
 93  Heiberg, supra note 56, at 1705. 
 94  Id. 
 95  The Taxpayer Advocate Service is an independent organization within the IRS that espouses to be 
the taxpayers’ “voice at the IRS.”  See The Taxpayer Advocate Service is Your Voice at the IRS, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/Advocate/The-Taxpayer-Advocate-Service-Is-Your-Voice-at-the-IRS (last updated 
Mar. 14, 2014). 
 96  See Heiberg, supra note 56, at 1706. 
 97  Id. 
 98  See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (2010). 
 99  Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501–535, 
124 Stat. 71, 97–115 (2010). 
 100  Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, OECD, 
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consisted of OECD countries and jurisdictions that agreed to exchange tax-
related information to achieve greater tax transparency.101  The Global 
Forum was restructured in 2009 to strengthen this exchange of 
information.102 
 
1.  The Emergence of International Tax Standards 
 
In 2009, the Group of Twenty (G20)103 expressed willingness to 
sanction jurisdictions that were reluctant to adopt the tax standards of the 
2002 OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters 
and the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital.104  Since 
then, an ever-increasing number of countries have cooperatively adopted 
international tax standards, thereby indicating a willingness to set aside 
traditional notions of sovereignty on tax matters in exchange for transparent 
sovereignty⎯something that is critical for modern governance.105 
Initiatives to coordinate tax policies between countries have been 
proposed for years, especially because tax havens have become increasingly 
burdensome to industrialized countries.106  Because most governments want 
to limit their use, the appropriate means of dealing with tax havens has 
become a vigorous debate.107 
 
2.  Membership 
 
As of November 2014, the Global Forum is comprised of 123 
members, on equal footing, that are committed to implementing 
international standards of tax transparency and exchange of information.108  
Developing countries are invited to join the Global Forum and benefit from 
 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Formed in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1999, the G20 is a bloc of nineteen countries 
and the European Union that meets annually to discuss “ways to strengthen the global economy, reform 
international financial institutions, improve finance regulation and implement the key economic reforms 
that are needed in each member economy.”  About G20, G20, https://www.g20.org/about_G20 (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2014). 
 104  Miguel González Marcos, Seclusion in (Fiscal) Paradise is Not an Option: The OECD Harmful 
Tax Practices Initiative and Offshore Financial Centers, 24 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2011). 
 105  Id. at 5.  Tax havens “(1) rob prosperous industrialized countries of their tax revenues; (2) permit 
too much bank, corporate and individual secrecy; and (3) lack vigor in the fight against money 
laundering.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted). 
 106  See id. 
 107  See id. at 6–7. 
 108  Members of the Global Forum, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/membersofthe 
globalforum.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
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these standards,109 with members’ compliance enforced through an in-depth 
peer review and monitoring process.110 
 
B.  Examining the Playbook: Keys to Success 
 
The Global Forum’s success is attributable to its emphasis on 
coordination, balance, and multilateral tax treaties.  The following 
subsections explore each of those elements in greater detail. 
 
1.  Coordination 
 
Coordination between countries is necessary to effectively address the 
cross-border problem of offshore tax evasion.  But to facilitate and sustain 
intrajurisdictional cooperation, countries’ respective tax revenues must be 
linked to their shared goals.111  Specifically, industrialized countries must 
recognize and address developing countries’ goals, such as equitable 
distribution of tax revenues, better resource allocation, discouragement of 
economic crimes, and furtherance of institutional quality and growth.112  
The process of reaching these multilateral agreements must also be fair, 
transparent, and participatory, granting equal footing to all potential 
signatories.113 
 
2.  Balance 
 
Another impediment to securing and sustaining multilateral tax treaties 
is countries’ legitimate fear of losing sovereignty.114  Balancing national 
sovereignty and compliance with international tax standards is critical 
because tax evasion is a global problem; it cannot be effectively overcome 
through national policies alone.115   
Thus, countries that adopt international tax standards must reconcile 
their dual interests in maintaining national sovereignty and complying with 
 
 109  Frequently Asked Questions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/Frequently 
%20asked%20questions.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
 110  Id.  All Global Forum members undergo peer reviews of their implementation of international 
tax standards.  These peer reviews involve the following two phases: (1) a review of each jurisdiction’s 
legal and regulatory framework for tax transparency and exchange of information, and (2) a review and 
subsequent rating of the practical implementation of the tax standards.  Id. 
 111  See Marcos, supra note 104, at 30. 
 112  Id. at 30–31. 
 113  Id. at 32. 
 114  Id. at 27. 
 115  Id. at 27–28. 
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foreign demands for transparency.116  In doing so, countries should consider 
(1) modifying their existing domestic tax laws to comply with international 
tax standards, (2) the negative effects of limiting access to FFIs, (3) the 
projected income loss from decreased offshore financial services and 
alternate sources of revenue, and (4) ways of balancing the exchange of 
information with foreign countries and domestic citizens’ right to 
privacy.117 
International tax standards can also produce inefficient results in the 
“global allocation of capital” if certain countries’ domestic tax laws do not 
reflect principles of international tax neutrality.118  To avoid this 
undesirable hodgepodge, countries should collaboratively analyze how 
international tax standards can be used to provide developmental 
assistance.119 
 
3.  Multilateral Tax Treaties 
 
In addition to coordination and balance, jurisdictions must consider 
how to adopt and implement international tax transparency and information 
exchange standards⎯unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally.  The United 
States currently has bilateral income tax treaties with sixty-eight 
countries.120  However, bilateral tax treaties may be inadequate when 
jurisdictions’ domestic tax policies closely resemble one another.121 
In fact, bilateral tax treaties might even boost tax havens’ appeal as 
destinations for establishing business ventures because of the superficial 
display of good governance that could result after entering into these 
treaties.122  Therefore, multilateral tax treaties are a long-term solution to 
combatting offshore tax evasion because they are better suited to foster 
cooperation and balance between countries seeking to adopt and implement 




 116  Id. at 34. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. at 22–23.  Developing countries fear that tax coordination will only benefit their more 
industrialized counterparts.  See id. 
 119  Id. at 23–24. 
 120  United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-
Businesses/United-States-Income-Tax-Treaties---A-to-Z (last updated Oct. 21, 2013). 
 121  Marcos, supra note 104, at 25–26. 
 122  See id. at 26.  Because bilateral tax treaties do not promote international coordination, 
cooperation, or even coercion to the extent that their multilateral counterparts do, they are less likely to 
induce true tax transparency in signatory tax havens.  See id. at 26 n.143. 
 123  Id. 
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V.  THE BLUEPRINT: IGAS 
 
The Global Forum operates within a cooperative, balanced, and 
multilateral framework.124  Countries on equal footing draft, adopt, and 
implement international standards of tax transparency and exchange of 
information.125  But the Global Forum’s impact is limited to individual 
countries’ initiative to modify their domestic tax laws in compliance with 
international standards.126  Unfortunately, the Global Forum lacks a 
punitive means of addressing noncompliant jurisdictions that denounce its 
message, or that just accept it superficially without making any tangible 
changes to their domestic tax laws. 
By enacting FATCA and reforming its domestic tax laws, the United 
States wholeheartedly embraced the Global Forum’s gospel.127  
Surprisingly, however, some of FATCA’s foreign critics are also members 
of the Global Forum.128  (Et tu, Brute?)  Foreign banks, including those in 
countries belonging to the Global Forum, have also harshly criticized the 
legislation.129 
 This backlash can be traced to FATCA’s misplaced reliance on a 
bank-to-residence government (B2G) approach to international tax 
information reporting.130  This section examines that misplaced reliance and 
then suggests a better approach that is already gaining traction⎯IGAs. 
 
A.  Fundamentally Flawed: The B2G Approach 
 
FATCA’s B2G approach leaves foreign governments completely out 
of the “information reporting chain” relying instead on full compliance by 
FFIs.131  While this approach provides greater simplicity, FATCA cannot 
realistically solve the United States’ offshore tax evasion problem without 
collaborating with foreign governments.132  Additionally, levying the 30% 
 
 124  See OECD, IMPLEMENTING THE TAX TRANSPARENCY STANDARDS: A HANDBOOK FOR 
ASSESSORS & JURISDICTIONS 7 (2010). 
 125  Id. 
 126  See, e.g., Angel Gurria, Sec’y-Gen., OECD, Opening Remarks at the Fourth Meeting of the 
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Oct. 25, 2011) (stating 
that Belgium, Malaysia, Luxembourg, and the Philippines have taken domestic action to improve other 
countries’ access to their tax information) (emphasis added). 
 127  See generally id. (stating that the battle for fairer international tax laws involves countries 
amending their domestic tax laws). 
 128  Behrens, supra note 10, at 210. 
 129  Id. at 210–11. 
 130  See Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax Reporting, 57 VILL. L. 
REV. 529, 530 (2012). 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id.  FFIs are unlikely to comply with FATCA, an exclusively American law, if doing so violates 
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withholding tax on noncompliant FFIs would inevitably damage the United 
States’ relationship with both the FFIs and foreign governments.133  
Conversely, ineffectual enforcement of FATCA’s provisions severely 
diminishes its viability as a means of combating offshore tax evasion. 
 
B.  Let Us Take a Moment and Give Thanks 
 
It would be unfair, however, to continue discussing FATCA’s flaws 
without also crediting the law for its innovative push towards increased 
transparency in international tax reporting and information exchange.  First, 
FATCA’s 30% withholding tax covers practically all returns from financial 
investment accounts.134  FATCA’s scope is also not limited to proceeds 
from gains on sale; it covers all gross proceeds from sales.135  This is a 
noteworthy feat because collecting the right amount of taxes on U.S.-source 
investment returns is an age-old problem that FATCA’s predecessor, the 
U.S. “qualified intermediary” (QI) program, did not adequately address.136 
Second, FATCA employs source withholding in requiring account 
disclosure regardless of whether the account generates U.S.-source income 
or if it is simply held by an FFI.137  FATCA also effectively uses the threat 
of source withholding on U.S.-source investment accounts to prompt the 
disclosure of other accounts owned by U.S. citizens.138 
Third, FATCA requires FFIs to determine whether de facto U.S. 
ownership exists instead of simply relying on clients’ assertions of their tax 
status or residence.139  This is a sharp departure from the QI program’s 
“know your customer” diligence rules that restricted additional 
investigation to situations where criminal activity seemed probable.140  
FATCA’s stringent diligence requirements also contrast with the general 
principle that tax preparers can rely on taxpayers’ representations absent a 
 
their host country’s bank secrecy laws, or if the costs of compliance greatly outweigh the continued 
benefits of retaining U.S. account holders. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. at 535. 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. at 530, 532.  The QI program did not provide the U.S. government with information about 
U.S. investors.  Unlike FATCA, the model QI agreement also did not contain significant withholding 
penalties.  But the QI program’s biggest drawback was its broad definition of a “beneficial owner,” 
which included corporations.  Thus, to circumvent the QI program’s rules, a U.S. taxpayer could form a 
non-U.S. shell corporation and list it as the account owner.  Then, magically, a “bona fide non-U.S. 
person” would own the corporation, relieving it of compliance with the QI rules.  See id. at 532–35. 
 137  See id. at 535. 
 138  See id. 
 139  See id. 
 140  Id. at 532, 533 & n.24. 
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valid reason to think otherwise.141 
Finally, FATCA does not assume that a corporation is the beneficial 
owner.  Instead it requires FFIs to report accounts in which a U.S. citizen 
holds more than 10% of the equity.142  In taking this approach, FATCA 
discards a traditional principle of American governance: treating 
corporations as taxpayers under U.S. federal income tax law.143 
Given the reasons described above, FATCA is undoubtedly an 
innovative piece of legislation, but impediments to its successful 
implementation include undesirable capital market disruptions, foreign 
bank secrecy laws that limit FFIs’ means and extent of compliance, and the 
United States’ limited jurisdiction to verify FFIs’ compliance. 
 
C.  There is Another Way 
 
Fortunately, B2G reporting is not the only approach to international 
tax information reporting.  There is another way⎯IGAs.  Many 
jurisdictions entered into IGAs with the United States after FATCA’s 
enactment, so that they could comply with its reporting requirements in a 
way that did not violate their domestic banking or secrecy laws.144  The 
following subsections will examine how IGAs mitigate conflicts between 
FATCA’s reporting requirements and foreign jurisdictions’ domestic laws. 
 
1.  IGAs for Dummies 
 
FFIs, under FATCA, can avoid being withheld upon by registering 
with the IRS and agreeing to report specified information about U.S. 
accounts and foreign accounts with substantial U.S. owners.145  This can be 
done in one of two ways: (1) Model 1 IGAs, or (2) Model 2 IGAs.146  
Model 1 IGAs are agreements between the United States and a foreign 
government regarding compliance with FATCA.147  FFIs do not enter into 
 
 141  Id. at 536. 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. 
 144  As of March 2014, more than forty jurisdictions have entered into signed IGAs with the United States.  
FATCA – Archive, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/ 
pages/fatca-archive.aspx (last updated Sept. 29, 2014). 
 145  FATCA Information for Foreign Financial Institutions and Entities, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Information-for-Foreign-Financial-Institutions (last 
updated Mar. 17, 2014). 
 146  See IRS, Rev. Proc. 2014-13, 2014-3 I.R.B., FINAL FFI AGREEMENT FOR PARTICIPATING FFI AND 
REPORTING MODEL 2 FFI (2014) [hereinafter Rev. Proc. 2014-13], available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-
3_IRB/ar10.html. 
 147  Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-1(78) (2014). 
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FFI Agreements with the IRS under Model 1 IGAs.148  Instead, FFIs make 
the required disclosures to their host country’s government, which in turn 
provides this information to the IRS.149 
Model 1 IGAs come in the following two flavors: (1) reciprocal, and 
(2) nonreciprocal.150  As their label indicates, reciprocal Model 1 IGAs 
require a dual exchange of information between the United States and a 
foreign government regarding their respective resident account holders.151  
On the other hand, nonreciprocal Model 1 IGAs only require the foreign 
government to report this information to the United States.152  But 
regardless of whether the Model 1 IGA is reciprocal or nonreciprocal, both 
versions require FFIs to report specified information about accounts held by 
U.S. citizens or by foreign entities controlled by U.S. citizens.153 
Model 2 IGAs, on the other hand, require FFIs to directly report 
information to the IRS.154  Under this approach, the foreign government 
enables FFIs within its jurisdiction to “register and ‘comply with the 
requirements of an FFI Agreement, including . . . due diligence, reporting, 
and withholding.’”155  FATCA permits FFIs to avoid its 30% withholding 
tax by entering into an FFI Agreement with the IRS, thereby agreeing to 
make required disclosures.156 
 
 148  RAYMOND J. HOLST, JIYEON LEE-LIM & WILLIAM LU, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS UNDER FATCA: COMPARING THE TWO MODELS 2 (2013).   
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. 
 153  Id.  This required information includes U.S.-taxpayer identification numbers and payments to 
nonparticipating FFIs (institutions that do not comply with FATCA’s provisions).  Id. 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id.  These disclosures are supplemented with additional exchanges of information between the 
IRS and the foreign government or its agency.  Amy P. Jetel & Lauren Fitte, IRS Releases Final FFI 
Agreement, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Jan. 10, 2014), http://wealth management.com/estate-
planning/irs-releases-final-ffi-agreement. 
 156  Jetel & Fitte, supra note 155.  An FFI Agreement requires participating FFIs to do the following: 
(1)  perform due diligence and to identify accounts held by U.S. persons; 
(2)  report those accounts on Form 8966; 
(3) withhold and remit [a] 30 percent tax on accounts for which the withholding is 
required (and file the appropriate Forms 1042, if required); 
(4) report income on Form 1099 if it elects to perform full reporting (rather than 30 
percent withholding) for an account holder that is a U.S. person; 
(5) retain certain information on U.S. accounts and comply with IRS requests for 
additional information; 
(6) furnish valid withholding certificates to each withholding agent from which it 
receives a withholdable payment; and 
(7)  close certain accounts of “recalcitrant” account holders.   
Id. 
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The IRS further differentiated between Model 1 and Model 2 IGAs on 
December 26, 2013 when it published Revenue Procedure 2014-13 (Final 
Agreement), which pertains to FFIs entering into an FFI Agreement 
(participating FFIs) and FFIs treated as reporting institutions under Model 2 
IGAs.157  Interestingly, the Final Agreement does not address Model 1 
IGAs.158  Therefore, Model 1 IGAs permit FFIs to comply with FATCA’s 
reporting requirements without having to enter into an FFI Agreement with 
the IRS.159  Conversely, Model 2 IGAs require signatory jurisdictions to 
comply with the terms of an FFI Agreement.160 
 
2.  Apples to Apples?: Comparing Model 1 and Model 2 IGAs 
 
The following subsections compare the due diligence, information 
reporting, withholding, and enforcement provisions of Model 1 and Model 
2 IGAs.  This comparison is then used to evaluate each IGA model’s 
respective impact on FFIs and their host government. 
 
a.  Due Diligence 
 
Both IGA models have similar due diligence requirements.  Model 1 
IGAs contain a section entitled Annex I, which lists due diligence 
requirements to guide FFIs in determining what information to report to the 
IRS.161  Alternatively, signatories to Model 1 IGAs may permit their FFIs to 
adopt the Regulations’ stricter due diligence requirements.162  Model 2 
IGAs also contain an Annex I section that lists due diligence requirements 
for FFIs.163  Like Model 1 IGAs, Model 2 IGAs permit FFIs to alternatively 
apply the Regulations’ requirements.164  But if FFIs choose to apply the 
Regulations’ requirements, they must continually do so unless there is a 
“material modification to the Regulations.”165  Additionally, Model 2 IGAs 
 
 157  Id.; see also Rev. Proc. 2014-13, supra note 146. 
 158  Jetel & Fitte, supra note 155. 
 159  Id. 
 160  Id. 
 161  HOLST, LEE-LIM & LU, supra note 148, at 2. 
 162  Id.  “Regulations” refer to the final and temporary regulations revising FATCA’s provisions released by 
the Treasury Department and the IRS.  See generally Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-FATCA (last updated 
Sept. 15, 2014). 
 163  HOLST, LEE-LIM & LU, supra note 148, at 2. 
 164  Id. at 2–3. 
 165  Id.  Nonexclusive examples of material modifications include changes to the following: 
[1] The yield of a debt instrument by more than the greater of 25 basis points or 5% of 
the annual yield[;] 
[2] The timing of payments on a debt instrument that results in a material deferral of 
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require FFIs to comply with the terms of an FFI Agreement.166 
 
b.  Information Reporting 
 
In addition to the due diligence requirements discussed above, each 
IGA model requires specified information reporting by FFIs.  Under Model 
1 IGAs, FFIs must report specified information to their host governments 
that, in turn, provide this information to the IRS.167  This exchange of 
information compels foreign governments to adopt and enforce laws 
requiring FFIs to comply with FATCA-mandated disclosures.168  Providing 
this information to the IRS is also an added administrative and financial 
burden for foreign governments.169  On the bright side, however, the 
growing pains might be worthwhile if the foreign government wants U.S. 
financial institutions to reciprocate information about its citizens.170 
Unlike its Model 1 counterparts, Model 2 IGAs cut out the middleman 
by requiring FFIs to directly report information to the IRS.171  But 
unfortunately for foreign governments, Model 2 IGAs still involve some 
administrative and financial costs if the IRS seeks additional information 
about a U.S. account holder.172 
 
c.  Withholding 
 
Neither IGA model subjects FFIs to FATCA withholding on payments 
received or made, as long as the FFIs comply with their governing IGA’s 
requirements.173  But, unlike Model 1 IGAs, Model 2 IGAs have a bite.  If 
the IRS requests additional information about an account and the foreign 
government fails to respond within six months, FATCA requires FFIs to 
 
scheduled payments[;] 
[3] The obligor or security underlying a debt instrument[; and] 
 [4] The nature of the obligation that causes it not to be a debt instrument.  
Final FATCA Regulations Training Session #1: Update on Changes to Witholding & Grandfathered 
Obligations, CITIBANK (June 2013), http://www.citibank.com/transactionservices/home/about_us/online_ 
academy/materials/docs/fatca_withholding.pdf. 
 166  HOLST, LEE-LIM & LU, supra note 148, at 3.  Adherence to the terms of an FFI Agreement is not 
required if a specific Model 2 IGA’s terms provide otherwise.  Id. 
 167  Id. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. 
 171  Id. 
 172  Id.  Model 2 IGAs oblige foreign governments to obtain and provide requested, additional 
information to the IRS.  See id. 
 173  Id. at 4.  FFIs that fail to comply with the requirements of their governing Model 1 IGA are not 
subject to FATCA withholding unless the IRS labels them as nonparticipating financial institutions.  Id. 
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withhold when paying the account “(i) [U.S.-source] FDAP income, 
(ii) gross proceeds from the disposition of property of a type that can 
produce [U.S.-source] dividends or interest or (iii) foreign passthru 
payments.”174  This withholding requirement also applies when FFIs make 
any of these three types of payments to nonparticipating FFIs.175 
Unsurprisingly, FFIs prefer Model 1 IGAs because FATCA 
withholding under them is not dependent on host governments providing 
requested information to the IRS within six months.176  Compared to Model 
2 IGAs, Model 1 IGAs also impose less withholding responsibility on 
FFIs.177 
 
d.  Enforcement 
 
Lastly, there is the issue of enforcement.  Model 1 IGAs require 
foreign governments to enact and enforce local laws to ensure that FFIs 
comply with their governing IGA’s requirements.178  But under Model 2 
IGAs, foreign governments do not have an enforcement role.179  Thus, 
Model 1 IGAs provide FFIs with an advantage that Model 2 IGAs lack— 
interaction, from the onset, with their host governments regarding 
compliance with FATCA.180  Model 1 IGAs also provide foreign 
governments with advantages, including increased control of FFIs within 
their jurisdiction and greater transparency regarding the FFIs’ compliance 
with FATCA’s provisions.181 
 
3.  Survey Says: OECD Agrees! 
 
With FATCA and the IGA models described above paving the way, 
G20 leaders endorsed the OECD proposal of an international information 
exchange model in September 2013.182  This endorsement came on the 
 
 174  Id. 
 175  Id. 
 176  See id. at 4–5. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Id. at 5.  If an FFI is noncompliant with its obligations under its governing Model 1 IGA for 
longer than eighteen months, the IRS may place the FFI on a nonparticipating financial institutions list, 
thereby subjecting it to FATCA withholding on payments received.  Id. 
 179  Id.  If an FFI is noncompliant with its obligations under its governing Model 2 IGA for twelve 
months or more, the IRS may place the FFI on a nonparticipating financial institutions list, thereby 
subjecting it to FATCA withholding on payments received.  Id. 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. 
 182  OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION 44 
(2014) [hereinafter STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE], available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-information-in-tax-
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heels of many European countries announcing their intention to implement 
FATCA.183  In February 2014, the G20 leaders invited the OECD to 
propose a specific standard for consideration by the G20 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors.184 
 Subsequently, the OECD published a 2014 report containing the 
Common Reporting Standard (CRS), which specifies reporting and due 
diligence procedures for financial institutions.185  The CRS, which to a large 
extent was inspired by FATCA,186 contains a reporting and due diligence 
standard that implementing jurisdictions must locally adopt and enforce.187  
In this regard, the CRS shares some similarities with Model 1 IGAs because 
both information-reporting mechanisms require collaboration with foreign 
governments.  But unlike the IGA models, which are distinguishable from 
one another and which seek to primarily benefit the United States’ efforts in 
curbing U.S. tax evasion, the purpose of the CRS is to facilitate a standard 
international model of automatic information exchange.  Thus, the CRS 
seeks to avoid the proliferation of varying, complex, and expensive 
standards for foreign governments and their financial institutions.188 
Even though the CRS deviates from the IGA models in some 
respects,189 both approaches are generally compatible because they adopt an 
intergovernmental, reciprocal approach to international tax information 
reporting.190  In addition to the CRS, the 2014 OECD report contained a 
model competent authority agreement or arrangement (Model CAA), which 
specifies rules governing the exchange of tax information that can be 
executed within existing legal treaties or agreements.191 
The 2014 OECD report also highlighted the following factors as 
crucial to a successful automatic exchange model: (1) a common standard 
on information reporting, due diligence, and exchange of information; (2) a 
legal and operational basis for the exchange of information; and 
 
matters.htm. 
 183  Id. at 5.  On April 9, 2013, Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
stated they would exchange tax information, similar to that required under FATCA, among themselves 
and with the United States.  On April 13, 2013, Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, 
and Romania announced similar intentions.  By May 14, 2013, seventeen countries endorsed a 
multilateral tax information exchange approach.  Soon afterwards, Mexico, Norway, and Australia 
joined the club.  Id. 
 184  Id. at 6. 
 185  Id. at 6–7. 
 186  Id. 
 187  Id. 
 188  Id. at 6. 
 189  Id. at 7.  Key differences include FATCA’s U.S. citizenship-based model and its withholding tax.  
Id. 
 190  Id. 
 191  Id. at 3. 
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(3) common or compatible technical solutions.192  The first factor entails 
developing a wide scope for financial information that must be reported193 
and then imposing these reporting requirements on an equally wide scope 
of account holders194 and financial institutions.195  Furthermore, effective 
procedures need to be established to ensure the quality and accuracy of the 
relayed information.196 
The second factor, a legal and operational basis for the exchange of 
information, seeks to establish a multilateral exchange instrument to 
facilitate information reporting in lieu of the bilateral treaties that currently 
exist.197  The greatest advantage of a multilateral approach is its 
international reach, which promotes administrative cooperation and 
transparency between jurisdictions.198  Lastly, the third feature, common or 
compatible technical solutions, requires standardization of reporting to keep 
costs down for all participating jurisdictions.199 
 
VI.  PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
 
FATCA is an innovative and bold piece of legislation.  It is a no-holds-
barred Congressional crackdown on U.S.-source piggy banks stashed 
overseas.  But FFIs and foreign governments do not have to comply with an 
exclusively American law, especially where the perceived headaches 
associated with compliance outweigh the anticipated benefits.  Fortunately, 
Model 1 and Model 2 IGAs between the United States and foreign 
governments provide a cooperative, coordinated, and transparent solution. 
Still, bilateral IGAs are just the tip of the iceberg; their impact on 
global information reporting is limited to the signatory jurisdictions.  
Different jurisdictions’ IGAs will also inevitably contain varying 
requirements and enforcement mechanisms.  This adds greater complexity 




 192  Id. at 7–9. 
 193  Id. at 7–8.  The scope should be wide enough to include various sources of investment income 
(e.g., interest, dividends, etc.).  Id. 
 194  Id.  “Account holders” should be defined in a manner that prevents individuals from 
avoiding their obligation to report tax information through “interposed legal entities or 
arrangements.”  Id. 
 195  Id. at 8.  The scope of financial institutions subject to required reporting should include banks, 
brokers, and insurance companies.  Id. 
 196  Id. 
 197  Id. 
 198  Id. 
 199  Id. at 9. 
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The United States must therefore continue working with the OECD 
towards the adoption of a multilateral, automatic information exchange 
standard, which will enhance tax transparency and reduce tax evasion at an 
international level.  Wide-scale adoption of a standardized model will also 
reduce the administrative costs of implementation, in addition to 
simplifying compliance procedures for participating jurisdictions.  
Consequently, nonparticipating jurisdictions will find it increasingly 
difficult to resist joining the kumbaya. 
Tax evasion is not a uniquely American problem.  Its solution should 
not be either. 
 
